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Abstract 
 
A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key 
assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is 
manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence 
underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the 
assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. 
Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most 
damning violation of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by 
substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception—not a common 
occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of 
Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from 
study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian 
principles.  
 
Keywords: The backfire effect, confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, Bayesian inference, 
hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion 
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Biased Belief in the Bayesian Brain: A Deeper Look at the Evidence 
 
1. Bayesian Models of Cognition 
 
Recent years have witnessed an explosion in theoretical and empirical interest in 
hierarchical Bayesian models of cognition (Clark, 2013, 2016; Friston, 2005; Hohwy, 2013). 
An underlying principle of these models is the predictive processing view of cognition, 
which characterizes the human mind as an anticipatory predictive engine whose primary 
drive is to minimize the mismatch between its model of the world and incoming sensory 
input—referred to as prediction error. The putative structure of this process of “prediction 
error minimization” is hierarchical—from perceptual content at the lower levels through to 
abstract beliefs at the highest levels. Distinct levels act as priors for the levels immediately 
below, and only the unpredicted aspect of a signal (i.e., the prediction error) is propagated up 
the hierarchy.  
 
This account entails a unique story about how humans update their beliefs. Namely, 
via the adjustment of higher level priors in an attempt to minimize prediction error fed 
forward from the lower levels of the hierarchy. Furthermore, this process constitutes a 
neurobiologically-plausible account of how Bayesian inference is implemented in the human 
brain. Specifically, because a system which operates according to the principles of prediction 
error minimization will necessarily approximate Bayesian inference over the long term 
(Hohwy, 2017)1. 
 
One of the more promising aspects of hierarchical Bayesian models of cognition is 
their potential to explain delusional beliefs as a function of aberrant processing in the 
aforementioned hierarchy (e.g., Adams et al., 2013; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 
2010). At the heart of this approach is the notion of excessive precision—whether this 
pertains to overly-precise priors or overly-precise prediction error (Williams, 2018, p. 133). 
Over-precision is suggested to produce two kinds of delusion-relevant effects. The first is that 
prediction error signal which ought to be disregarded propagates up the hierarchy, eventually 
having to be explained away—with the agent revising her model of the world and forming a 
delusional belief in the process. The second is that overly-precise (i.e., delusional) priors 
exert top down influence on incoming sensory evidence—shaping the way the agent sees the 
world.  
 
In a recent article (Consciousness and Cognition, 61, 129-147, 2018), Williams draws 
on several arguments to advance a critique of these hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion 
(HBMD). One of his key arguments is that belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) 
mind is manifestly non-Bayesian.2 Thus, he argues, this undermines the case for 
characterizing delusionality as arising from deficits in otherwise Bayes optimal processing. In 
support of his argument that belief formation in the neurotypical mind is manifestly non-
Bayesian, Williams (2018) cites three phenomena: 
 
1. The Backfire Effect 
                                                      
1 The notion of Bayesian inference over the long-term is key here. Isolated deviations from Bayes optimality do 
not constitute credible counter examples to the predictive processing account, unless it can be shown that they 
are part of a consistent pattern of non-Bayesian belief formation.  
2 More accurately, the argument rests on whether belief formation approximates, rather than exactly implements 
Bayesian inference (Williams, 2018, p. 140). When using terms such as “Bayesian” or “non-Bayesian”, we refer 
here to processes which approximate Bayesian inference in some principled manner. 
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2. Confirmation Bias 
3. Motivated Reasoning 
 
Here we expand on Williams’ (2018) treatment of these phenomena. Specifically, we 
consider more deeply the extent to which empirical evidence for each of these phenomena 
demonstrate that belief formation in the neurotypical mind violates Bayesian inference.  
Ultimately, we conclude that this evidence does not convincingly demonstrate a violation of 
Bayesian inference. Our conclusion rests on two key points. First, while the backfire effect 
has been documented in a number of studies—and indeed seems problematic for many 
Bayesian models—a substantial number of recent studies find no evidence of backfire, even 
under theoretically favorable conditions. This evidence suggests the phenomenon is 
considerably less prevalent than assumed, and, by Williams’ (2018) own criterion, does not 
therefore undermine Bayesian models of cognition (at least, not convincingly). Second, 
paradigmatic studies of confirmation bias and motivated reasoning fail to demonstrate 
convincing violations of Bayesian inference, for three reasons. First, the key outcome 
variable in many of the relevant studies is not belief updating, but evidence evaluation. 
Second, the designs of these studies often preclude causal inferences on the role of 
motivation in evidence evaluation. Third, where patterns of evidence evaluation in such 
studies are subjected to formal Bayesian analysis, they appear consistent with Bayesian 
principles. Taken together, this makes it difficult to interpret evidence for these phenomena 
as a convincing refutation of Bayesian inference. 
 
2. Evidence of Non-Bayesian Belief Formation 
 
In this section, we offer a more thorough discussion of the empirical evidence 
underlying the three phenomena cited by Williams: the backfire effect, confirmation bias and 
motivated reasoning. The empirical literature on each of these topics is vast and 
heterogeneous, and discussing all the evidence is well beyond the scope of this article. We 
thus focus primarily on the evidence referred (or alluded) to by Williams (2018). 
 
2.1. The Backfire Effect 
 
The backfire effect refers to the phenomenon whereby people become more confident 
in their initial belief after receiving evidence that contradicts that belief. Williams (2018) 
states that backfire is “most damning” (p. 142) for the notion that neurotypical belief 
formation is Bayesian, a position recently—and forcefully—staked out by others 
(Mandelbaum, 2018). The notion of backfire is indeed problematic for HBMD, primarily 
because the phenomenon of increasing confidence in P when presented evidence that ~P 
appears to directly contradict key principles of Bayesian inference. However, as we will 
highlight below, the backfire citations in Williams (2018; and in Mandelbaum, 2018) are 
highly selective, and, as a result, leave an impression of the prevalence of backfire that is at 
odds with a large body of recent evidence.  
 
Arguably the most famous evidence of backfire—cited by Williams—is reported in 
Nyhan and Reifler (2010). Across a series of studies, these researchers found that political 
conservatives in the US became more confident that (i) Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) had been found in Iraq, and (ii) tax cuts increased government revenues, after 
receiving evidence contradicting these claims. Less often acknowledged is that Nyhan and 
Reifler (2010) did not replicate the WMD backfire result in a second experiment, and they 
also observed no backfire on the issue of stem cell research; suggesting that backfire is 
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subject to considerable contextual constraints (a point not lost on the authors at the time). 
Nevertheless, more recent evidence of similar backfire effects has been reported. For 
example, in 2013, Nyhan, Reifler and Ubel reported that, after receiving a correction to the 
myth that the Affordable Care Act would create “death panels”, US respondents who were 
both (i) highly knowledgeable about politics and (ii) supporters of Sarah Palin increased their 
belief in the myth. Schaffner and Roche (2017) also found that US Republicans’ beliefs about 
employment rates appeared to update in the opposite direction to that implied by an 
employment report released by the Obama administration—suggestive of backfire.  
 
The interpretation of other evidence often cited in support of the backfire effect (e.g., 
Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Nyhan et al., 2014; Zhou, 2016) is complicated 
by the fact that the “backfiring” in such experiments occurs not on measures of peoples’ 
descriptive beliefs about the world, but, rather, on their preferences and behavioural 
intentions. In fact, where researchers have measured both descriptive beliefs and 
preferences/behavioural intentions, “backfire” in the latter is often accompanied by 
appropriate descriptive belief change towards the evidence (e.g., Barrera et al., 2018; Nyhan 
et al., 2014). In these and similar cases, one is hard pressed to conclude that people backfired 
in their beliefs—without imposing additional assumptions about the relationship that exists 
between peoples’ descriptive beliefs on the one hand, and their preferences and behavioural 
intentions on the other. 
 
In contrast to the evidence of backfire outlined above, there are numerous recent 
studies that find no evidence of backfire of the kind reported in Nyhan and Reifler (2010). 
We highlight a number of the most rigorous and compelling cases below.  
 
In a series of five experiments—comprising more than 10,000 subjects and 52 
different political topics—Wood and Porter (2018) report that they failed to observe a single 
instance of backfire. This was despite inclusion of numerous “hot button” (US) issues in their 
experiment, such as gun violence, immigration, crime, abortion, and race—providing 
theoretically-favorable conditions for backfire to emerge. Guess and Coppock (2018) report a 
similar result. These authors fielded an experiment on the topic of gun control from 22-28 
June 2016; approximately 10 days after the mass shooting in Orlando, Florida. They 
presented subjects with evidence that gun control policy either (i) decreased or (ii) increased 
gun violence. Despite the context of the experiment—in the aftermath of a highly-publicized 
mass shooting—and a large, nationally representative sample of US adults (N=2,122), the 
authors observed scant evidence of backfire. They also report no evidence of backfire in a 
further two experiments conducted with large convenience samples (ibid.). Coppock (2016, 
Chapter 3) similarly failed to induce backfire in an earlier experiment that included 
threatening and insulting language alongside the presentation of evidence—again providing 
theoretically-favorable conditions for backfire. This result was recently replicated by Kim 
(2018, Study 4). 
 
Continuing on, both Nyhan and colleagues (2017) and Swire and colleagues (2017) 
recently conducted a series of experiments in which they presented subjects with corrections 
of inaccurate statements made by US President Donald Trump. Both sets of researchers 
found that subjects—in particular, those who were supporters of Donald Trump—
consistently incorporated these corrections into their beliefs; that is, they did not backfire. 
Pennycook and Rand (2017) report that tagging politically-favorable news stories as 
“disputed by fact checkers” did not cause people to backfire—that is, to rate the news story as 
more accurate. On the contrary, as intended, tags caused people to rate politically-concordant 
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news stories as less accurate. Barrera and colleagues (2018) found that French voters who 
supported Marine Le Pen updated their beliefs about immigration—if not their voting 
intentions—abiding the pro-immigration evidence that they received. Hill (2017) likewise 
observed that both US Republicans and Democrats updated their beliefs after receiving 
evidence about the truth (or falsity) of various partisan political facts—even if the evidence 
was politically uncongenial. Finally, Haglin (2017) recently observed no evidence of backfire 
in the domain of vaccination safety, in an experiment closely modelled after Nyhan and 
Reifler (2015). 
 
The above studies were conducted over a range of different topics, sampling 
populations and experimental designs. Of course, they do not reflect a systematic or 
exhaustive review of the relevant evidence, but, taken together, provide a strong challenge to 
the notion that backfire is prevalent—or even common—in human belief updating. On this 
basis, the backfire effect currently provides rather unconvincing evidence in support of 
Williams’s (2018; and Mandelbaum’s, 2018) argument that belief updating in the 
neurotypical population violates Bayesian inference3. As Williams (2018, p. 140) himself 
states, “the fact that one’s cousin Barry once violated Bayes optimality evidently does not 
undermine Bayesian models of cognition”. Likewise, the notion that some people sometimes 
backfire does not convincingly undermine the assumption that belief updating in the 
neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference4. 
 
2.2. Confirmation Bias 
 
Broadly speaking, confirmation bias refers to the phenomenon whereby new 
information is sought out or interpreted in patterns partial to existing beliefs (e.g., Nickerson, 
1998)5. In what follows, we address both types of confirmation bias independently (i.e., 
information search and information interpretation). First, consider confirmation bias in the 
way information is sought out—that is, information sampling. We note that non-Bayesian 
information sampling could feasibly exist in conjunction with Bayesian belief updating of the 
kind assumed by HBMD. In other words, in principle it is possible that the neurotypical mind 
combines new information with prior beliefs in a manner that approximates Bayesian 
inference, but samples—seeks out or otherwise obtains—that information in a distinctly non-
Bayesian manner; and does not, or cannot, correct for this bias in sampling (Fiedler, 2000)6.  
 
Such a possibility highlights a “moderately Bayesian” perspective on human belief 
formation, where belief updating may approximate Bayesian inference, but information 
sampling is underpinned by a process orthogonal to Bayesian inference. While some 
predictive coding accounts of cognition assume that perception, belief and action—including 
information sampling—are all accountable for within a single Bayesian framework (Friston, 
2012; Hohwy, 2013), this stronger position is by no means obligatory. In order for their 
                                                      
3 Added to this, recent work has pointed out that even the observation of backfire in human belief updating does 
not imply a cast-iron violation of Bayesian inference. In particular, because the phenomenon of backfire can be 
observed among unbiased Bayesian updaters (Bullock, 2009; Druckman & McGrath, 2018). 
4 This point is arguably more problematic for Mandelbaum (2018), whose central claim is that the backfire 
effect (what he terms “belief disconfirmation based polarization”) renders a Bayesian account of human belief 
updating untenable. 
5 The term has also been applied to the phenomenon of “positive test strategy” (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987). 
Since this also concerns information search—not belief updating per se—we do not discuss it further here. 
6 Interestingly, recent evidence from the domain of US politics suggests that such biased or “selective” sampling 
of information (on the internet, at least) may be less prevalent than assumed (e.g., Guess, 2018; Guess, Nyhan, 
Lyons, & Reifler, 2018; Flaxman et al., 2016; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011).  
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claims about aberrant precision estimation to hold, proponents of HBMD need only accept a 
picture of cognition whereby perception and belief formation—but not action—are 
underpinned by a hierarchical generative model, operating according to the principles of 
precision-weighted prediction error minimization. Given that most HBMD appear committed 
only to this weaker assumption, evidence of (confirmation) biased sampling in the 
neurotypical mind does not bear very strongly on their validity. 
 
What about confirmation bias in the interpretation of information? That is, the notion 
that “people are more receptive to evidence that confirms their prior beliefs” (Williams, 2018, 
p. 142; as cited in Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 218). The most straightforward empirical 
evidence for this notion is that individuals are prone to rate information as stronger or more 
convincing if it confirms vs. contradicts their prior beliefs (e.g., Koehler, 1993; Lord et al., 
1979; Taber & Lodge 2006; Tappin, Pennycook, & Rand, 2018). This effect is extremely 
robust; indeed, people are “often unable to escape the pull of their prior beliefs, which guide 
the processing of new information in predictable ways” (Taber & Lodge, 2006, p. 767, our 
emphasis). But the critical question is whether this evidence demonstrates a convincing 
violation of Bayesian inference.  
 
Gerber and Green (1999) think not (e.g., see p. 199). The view of these scholars is 
that peoples’ tendency to rate information as more convincing if it aligns with (vs. 
contradicts) prior beliefs does not reveal a credible violation of Bayesian inference. Indeed, 
they present a simple yet principled Bayesian model of belief formation that entails such a 
tendency. In doing so, they additionally point out that scholars rarely evaluate the 
aforementioned tendency with respect to a formal Bayesian model (a point also taken up at 
length in Hahn & Harris, 2014). Importantly, where such evaluation has occurred—like in 
their model—the interpretation of new information in light of prior beliefs is found to be 
consistent with Bayesian conditionalization (e.g., see Koehler, 1993). Obviously, this does 
not imply that such a tendency is desirable or normative by any or all judgmental standards 
(Cao, Kleiman-Weiner, & Banaji, 2018; Ditto et al., 2018a; Koehler, 1993). Nor does it 
imply that peoples’ evaluations of new information approximate Bayesian inference (see 
below). However, it does imply that one is hard pressed to take observation of such a 
tendency as convincing evidence against the notion that belief formation in the neurotypical 
mind approximates Bayesian inference (more on this in section 2.3).  
 
It must be noted that Bayesian models can accommodate a wide range of belief 
phenomena (Bullock, 2009). Indeed, unconstrained flexibility in specification of the prior and 
likelihood function allows almost any pattern of data to be explained. While the flexibility of 
Bayesian models has drawn criticism—not least from Williams (2018; see also Bowers & 
Davis, 2012)—it is only indirectly relevant to the point we make above. Which is that classic 
evidence of confirmation bias in the interpretation of new information is not a convincing 
refutation of Bayesian inference, given that this pattern of evidence has been shown to be 
consistent with Bayesian principles. Of course, given this flexibility, the reverse is also true: 
showing that peoples’ patterns of information evaluation are consistent with a Bayesian 
model does not by itself provide convincing support for the notion that neurotypical belief 
formation approximates Bayes, either. In other words, much of this evidence seems to be 
symmetrically undiagnostic: it neither convincingly undermines nor supports the notion that 
belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. One way to 
increase the diagnosticity of such evidence may be to measure not only the “location” of 
peoples’ prior beliefs and evidence evaluations—as is common in much of the relevant 
research—but, in addition, to map their precision (i.e., confidence) and distributional shape 
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(Bullock, 2009). This extra information would serve to constrain the Bayesian expectation, 
and thus provide a clearer picture of whether, how and to what extent the relevant human data 
violate Bayesian inference (Bullock, 2009; Gershman, 2018). 
 
2.3. Motivated Reasoning 
 
As described in Williams (2018, p. 142; as cited in Kunda, 1990, p. 480), motivated 
reasoning broadly refers to the phenomenon where people “arrive at conclusions that they 
want to arrive at when accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs.” The empirical 
literature on motivated reasoning is vast and heterogeneous, but Williams alludes to two 
factors that are posited to affect beliefs in a way that undermines Bayesian inference. They 
are preferences—what people desire to be true—and identity—what defines people and their 
important groups (e.g., political parties). Consequently, where we refer to “motivated 
reasoning”, we mean reasoning motivated by these factors (and not others). 
 
First, we note that we concur with Williams (2018) that motivated reasoning 
constitutes a clear challenge—in principle—to the assumption that human belief updating 
approximates Bayesian inference. The notion that beliefs are updated conditional on 
preferences and identities would seem to suggest that belief updating mechanisms are at best 
orthogonal to Bayesian inference, and, at worst, work directly against such principles7. 
However, as we will argue, paradigmatic evidence of motivated reasoning does not 
convincingly demonstrate such an idealized notion of the phenomenon.  
 
Indeed, turning to this evidence we find that—similar to confirmation bias in the 
interpretation of new information—the outcome variable in what is arguably the paradigmatic 
motivated reasoning study design is peoples’ evaluations of the reliability of new 
information. For recent and authoritative reviews, we refer to Ditto (2009), Ditto et al. 
(2018b) and Kahan (2016). It will help to describe the typical design here. The design 
involves randomly assigning people to one of two (or three, if a control is included) 
treatments; then, in each treatment, people receive some information. Across treatments, 
almost all characteristics of the information are held constant, save for the upshot of the 
information—which is manipulated to be consistent with either one type of outcome or 
another (e.g., that gun control laws reduce crime or do not reduce crime). Researchers 
measure peoples’ evaluations of the reliability of the information on self-report scales, and, 
typically, covariates (e.g., political identity) that are to be used in analysis. The critical 
inferential test is then conducted on the interaction between treatment (i.e., information) and 
covariate (e.g., political identity or some other preference for one outcome vs. another). If 
peoples’ evaluations of information reliability are observed to be conditional on their 
preferences or identities—that is, a statistically significant interaction term—motivated 
reasoning is typically inferred. As before, one can ask the following question: does such 
conditional evaluation of the reliability of information provide convincing evidence of a 
violation of Bayesian inference? 
                                                      
7 An exception to this may be Bayesian models in which beliefs are assumed to provide utility per se, which can 
explain patterns of belief updating seemingly at odds with simple Bayesian updating (e.g., see Sharot & Garrett, 
2016). As noted in Williams (2018, footnote 15, p. 142), such models “transform the issue from simple 
inference to the kinds of phenomena modelled in Bayesian decision theory”. The possibility of such models 
suggests that even observation of human belief updating that is conditional on preferences/identities cannot be 
taken as a cast-iron violation of Bayesian inference. Of course, the mere existence of such models cannot be 
taken as convincing evidence that “motivated” human belief updating approximates Bayesian inference, either 
(a point also made by Williams, 2018, footnote 15, p. 142; see also section 2.2 in the current paper). 
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We suggest that it does not. The primary reason is that, in the foregoing designs, 
motivation is not randomly assigned. Consequently, the critical inferential test is a treatment 
by covariate interaction, where only the former is randomized. This precludes the inference 
that motivation causes the observed patterns of information evaluation (e.g., Gerber & Green, 
2012; see also Druckman & McGrath, 2018; Kim, 2018). In other words, it prevents the key 
inference of motivated reasoning. A direct corollary is that the results from these designs are 
susceptible to (confounding) explanations based on prior beliefs—because the random 
assignment of information not only varies the consistency of said information with peoples’ 
preferences, political identities, and so on, but also with their prior beliefs (Tappin, 
Pennycook, & Rand, 2018); an “empirical catch-22” in motivated reasoning research (Ditto 
et al., 2018b, p. 13). In this light, then, the observed patterns of information evaluation may 
reduce to “people are more receptive to evidence that confirms their prior beliefs” (Williams, 
2018, p. 142)—and, as pointed out above, confirmation bias in the interpretation of new 
information does not provide particularly convincing evidence of a violation of Bayesian 
inference. 
 
Indeed, the tendency to judge the reliability of information sources based on how 
closely the information matches one’s existing beliefs is (i) arguably a sensible way of setting 
prior beliefs about reliability—particularly when other, more diagnostic information is 
scarce—and (ii) not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles (Baron & Jost, 2018; 
Gerber & Green, 1999; Koehler, 1993). As Hahn and Harris (2014, p. 90) point out: 
 
From a Bayesian, epistemological perspective, source and evidence characteristics 
combine to determine the overall diagnostic value of the evidence. Furthermore, the 
content of the testimony itself may provide one indicator (and in many contexts our 
only indicator) of the source’s reliability. Recent work in epistemology has thus 
endorsed the position that message content should impact our beliefs about the source. 
 
This point may be concretely appreciated by considering a fairly mundane example, 
offered in Gerber and Green (1999, pp. 197-198), which we reproduce here: 
 
Suppose that you are supervising an employee, and you have questions about the 
employee’s competence. After reviewing the employee’s work over the past year and 
speaking to a dozen of his co-workers, you conclude that the employee is not doing a 
good job. Just as you are about to call him into your office, you hear back from a final 
co-worker who says that, in his opinion, the employee is very capable. Although there 
is no reason a priori to consider this new report any less reliable than the dozen 
reports already given, it is hardly convincing evidence that the employee is in fact a 
good worker. It is far more likely that the new report is wrong and that the final co-
worker either has poor evaluation skills (this co-worker’s “study” has a 
methodological flaw) or has observed an uncharacteristic performance (the co-
worker’s “study” presents misleading findings due to “random error”). 
 
In sum, if one assumes that people consider the information they receive in typical 
motivated reasoning studies as not perfectly reliable—an extremely weak assumption, to be 
sure—the observation that people condition their evaluation of the reliability of that 
information on their prior beliefs seems both defensible, and, more importantly, not 
obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles (Gerber & Green, 1999; Hahn & Harris, 
2014; Koehler, 1993).  
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Of course, this argument applies only to those types of motivated reasoning study 
designs described above—that is, where motivation itself is not randomly assigned—and thus 
where prior beliefs are liable to confound evaluations of information reliability. However, 
there are different study designs that lay greater claim to ruling out the confounding influence 
of prior beliefs and/or licensing causal inference on the role of motivation. For example, 
some designs attempt to equalize prior beliefs across subjects (for a review of such attempts, 
see Ditto, 2009); while others randomly assign political party cues, rather than measuring 
political identity as a covariate (e.g., Cohen, 2003), or they randomly assign threat to—or 
affirmation of—identity (e.g., Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Coppock, 2016; Kim, 2018; 
Lyons, 2016; Nyhan & Reifler, 2018). We briefly consider each of these three designs in 
turn. 
 
In our estimation, the first type of design is difficult to rigorously implement in 
practice—given that the relevant prior beliefs are often likely to be numerous and embedded 
in a network of possibly interdependent beliefs, all of which may be brought to bear on 
reasoning (Gershman, 2018). Furthermore, recalling our earlier point, the “location” of 
subjects’ priors is typically all that is measured in such cases—not their precision or 
distributional shape (cf. Bullock, 2009). In the absence of the latter, it seems hard to 
confidently rule out their influence. Nevertheless, even if one assumes that prior beliefs are 
ruled out in paradigmatic motivated reasoning studies (e.g., Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 
1998; Ditto, Munro, et al., 2003), it is still not clear that the results from these studies are a 
convincing refutation of Bayesian inference. Specifically, because the results are typically 
interpreted as evidence for the “quantity-of-processing” (QOP) model of motivated reasoning 
(Ditto, 2009)—which departs in a crucial way from the classic model of motivated reasoning 
outlined by Kunda (1990) and cited by Williams (2018).  
 
In brief, the classic model assumes that people recruit cognitive processes to reach a 
particular, desired conclusion—explaining why they evaluate desirable information as more 
reliable than otherwise-identical undesirable information. The QOP model, on the other hand, 
explains this pattern of information evaluations by simply assuming that negatively-valenced 
stimuli trigger more detailed cognitive processing than (otherwise-identical) positively-
valenced stimuli; an asymmetry putatively underpinned by the adaptive advantage of 
allocating more cognitive resources to analyze threats (Ditto, 2009). The upshot of this 
asymmetry in the quantity of cognitive processing is two-fold. First, “it is almost inevitable 
that people will be more likely to consider multiple explanations for unwanted outcomes than 
wanted ones” (Ditto, 2009, p. 34). Second, as a direct result, “people will be more uncertain 
about the validity of preference-inconsistent than preference-consistent information” (p. 34, 
emphasis in the original). It is this difference in uncertainty, according to the QOP model, 
that causes individuals to evaluate undesirable information less favorably than otherwise-
identical desirable information. Far from refuting Bayesian inference, then, a key assumption 
of the QOP model—that individuals condition their evaluation of information reliability on 
its (perceived) uncertainty—seems quite consistent with Bayesian principles. Whether a 
tendency to devote greater cognitive processing to threatening stimuli per se constitutes a 
violation of Bayesian inference is unclear. However, it does not seem unreasonable to 
consider that people may have prior experience of the benefits of allocating their cognitive 
resources this way (to our knowledge, this is an open question). 
 
Regarding the second design type—party cues—as noted by Ditto and colleagues 
(2018a, p. 8) it appears quite reasonable for people to incorporate whether their political party 
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endorse (or oppose) the information at hand. Indeed, such reliance may reflect the role of 
prior beliefs—for example, beliefs about the relative trustworthiness of one’s in-party 
elites—rather than ruling them out (Druckman & McGrath, 2018). The final design type—
threatening or affirming identity—seems a promising design in principle to isolate causal 
effects of identity-motivation on belief formation. In practice, however, recent attempts at 
this have met with mixed results (e.g., Coppock, 2016, Chapter 3; Kim, 2018, Study 4; 
Lyons, 2016; Nyhan & Reifler, 2018). Overall, the evidence for motivated reasoning from 
these alternative designs either (i) does not convincingly rule out the influence of prior beliefs 
or (ii) where it does, the evidence appears mixed—and certainly not decisive one way or the 
other—or is interpreted as support for a model whose key insight appears quite consistent 
with Bayesian principles. As before, then, we defer to Williams’ (2018, p. 140) own criterion: 
“the fact that one’s cousin Barry once violated Bayes optimality evidently does not 
undermine Bayesian models of cognition”. Abiding this criterion, we are reluctant to consider 
such mixed evidence of motivated reasoning a convincing refutation of Bayesian inference. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
We have argued that the three phenomena cited by Williams (2018)—the backfire 
effect, confirmation bias and motivated reasoning—do not convincingly refute the notion that 
belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument 
hinged on our deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying these phenomena. 
Indeed, our aim in this paper was not to advance the case that human belief formation does 
approximate Bayesian inference; but, rather, to argue that classic evidence of backfire in 
belief updating, confirmation bias and motivated reasoning does not convincingly undermine 
such a case.  
 
We drew attention to substantial recent evidence that indicates the backfire effect is 
not as widespread as perhaps assumed; on the contrary, it appears to be the rather rare 
exception. Furthermore, we highlighted that paradigmatic evidence of confirmation bias and 
motivated reasoning derives from study designs that (i) measure how people evaluate the 
reliability of new information, and, in the latter case, (ii) often do not permit causal 
inferences on the role of motivation. Insofar as these study designs reveal that people 
condition their evaluation of new information on their prior beliefs, the results are not 
obviously inconsistent with Bayesian inference. On the contrary, such results appear 
consistent with Bayesian principles (Gerber & Green, 1999; Hahn & Harris, 2014; Koehler, 
1993). Likewise, we pointed out that studies that lay claim to ruling out the role of prior 
beliefs are taken as evidence for a model of motivated reasoning whose key assumptions 
appear quite consistent with Bayesian principles.  
 
Therefore, in our view one is hard pressed to conclude that evidence of the backfire 
effect, confirmation bias and motivated reasoning demonstrates that human belief formation 
is manifestly non-Bayesian. As such, contra Williams (2018), we conclude that these 
phenomena do not convincingly undermine hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion. 
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